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INTRODUCTION
In one of its original uses, "blackmail" meant the tribute paid by
English dwellers along the Scottish border to Scottish chieftains to
secure immunity from border raids.' "Mail" was then a wallet or
traveling bag and, by association, what was carried in such a bag,
such as what we now call mail.2 "White rent" was tendered in silver
coin ("white money"); blackmail was payment in kind, for example,
in cattle or labor.3 If the protection the chieftains sold was
protection against other marauders, they offered merely an ordinary
exchange of services for services. In that case, their offer, while
perhaps too good to refuse, was not like modern blackmail or
extortion. If their protection was from their own depredations, the
chieftains were like the modern mafia. Their offer of a deal was
extortion. Such an offer is also unlike modern blackmail. Blackmail
typically lies somewhere between these two possibilities. As in both
of these offers, there is an exchange that would leave both parties
better off by comparison to some alternative. But unlike mafia
extortion, some classes of blackmail do not entail costs to both
parties if the blackmail offer is refused.
To judge the morality of such variant problems, we must start
from a moral theory. For the past couple of centuries, the argu-
ment of choice in legal justification has been essentially utilitarian.
In recent decades, the utilitarian urge has been revised to handle
ordinal benefits without interpersonal comparison. It has belatedly
followed the developments in value theory in economics by ceasing
to inquire into aggregate, additive welfare and its maximization.
Instead, it is driven by concern with optimal arrangements that can
be characterized as mutually advantageous. Much of contemporary
law and economics is utilitarian in this sense, despite the sometime
disclaimers of scholars of law and economics. The core moral
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assumption in this body of law and economics is mutual advan-
tage.
4
Mutual advantage arguments have been applied to blackmail. I
wish to apply them to only certain instances of blackmail, namely
those instances that could be characterized as blackmail for mutual
advantage. Other types of blackmail would require additional
analysis and the conclusions on them might vary considerably.5 One
might suspect up front that the application of a general theory of
mutual advantage to blackmail cases that could be called mutual
advantage blackmail should generally permit such blackmail. This
does not follow, however, because what would be mutually advanta-
geous to the relevant parties case by case might not be mutually
advantageous to the larger society or to the potentially relevant
parties ex ante. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the most accept-
able case for blackmail would be for mutual advantage blackmail.
Hence, careful attention to mutual advantage blackmail is necessary
for a resolution of the justification of a general legal rule on
blackmail.
There are three general issues in the moral analysis of law that
bear heavily on the analysis of blackmail. First, rightness or
goodness cannot be read directly from the facts of a case at hand.
To get a value conclusion for a set of facts requires the introduction
of a value premise. Second, we cannot analyze rightness or
goodness at the case level. We must go to the larger institutional
level to grasp the full implications of a rule of law for the general
incentives it produces and other effects it may have. Third,
blackmail, as is true of many apparent actions governed by law, is
strategically complex and cannot be understood as a simple action.
It involves interaction with choices or actions of others, and takes
quite varied strategic forms.
After briefly canvassing these three issues, I will discuss the
strategic structures of three possible regimes of mutual advantage
blackmail. If strategic structure determines what should count as
blackmail, then blackmail pervades our lives and our social order.
Then I will turn to the moral analysis of a regime of legal regulation
4 See Russell Hardin, The Morality of Law and Economics, 11 L. & PHIL. 331,331-84
(1992).
5 Richard Posner refers briefly to the mutual advantage class of blackmail, and
notes that it is an exception to his general thesis that, for economic reasons, blackmail
should be legally suppressed. See Richard A. Posner, Blackmail Privacy, and Freedom
of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1839-39 (1993).
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for such blackmail and of the peculiar problem of blackmailing in
the public interest.
I. FACTS AND VALUES
Perhaps the central problem in understanding blackmail is
keeping normative and positive or conceptual claims separate.
There is a common tendency to read moral conclusions from mere
facts. As David Hume argued more than two centuries ago, we
cannot do this; instead, we must start with some moral principle or
theory and then read moral conclusions strictly with respect to this
principle or theory.6 Different moral principles may yield different
moral conclusions about a particular set of facts.
The movement of legal positivism was a child of the realization
that facts alone do not imply moral conclusions. In the positivist
tradition we may say that an action is illegal without saying anything
about whether it is immoral by any moral theory. To determine
whether it is illegal, we look to the law and not to some moral
theory or moral intuition.7 Only if the law says that a particular
moral principle or theory should inform legal statutes or judicial
decisions does the inference from morality to law follow. Then, of
course, it follows for the positive reason that the particular morality
has been positively sanctioned.
The problem with blackmail in the law is that virtually identical
actions can be blackmail in one instance and not in the other. We
cannot simply read from the facts of the cases that one was wrong
and the other right. Yet, "blackmail" is like "bribery" in that it is a
normative term in common parlance. To say on the street, at the
dinner table, or in the newspaper that some action is blackmail is
generally to say it is wrong. Because the law is too crude an
instrument for correcting some wrongs, not every wrong act should
be illegal. But the law of blackmail is largely defended as law
restricting actions or outcomes that are wrong or bad.
6 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 468-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge &
P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978) (1739-40).
7 See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 4-6 (1963) (condemning the use
of law as an enforcement of morality); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593, 621-24 (1958) (same). For contrary views, see
PATRICK DEVUjN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 124-39 (1965); LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW 33-152 (2d ed. 1969); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-
A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630 passim (1958).
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Consider a legal interaction that has the structure of blackmail.
In many kinds of cases, it has become the conventional practice to
strike bargains with those accused of crimes. Charges are dropped
or reduced on condition that the accused do some kind of commu-
nity service or that the accused leave the job in which she has done
some wrong, such as molesting school children. In plea bargaining,
charges are reduced in return for the accused's acceptance of a
penalty for the lesser crime.8 In the United States, prosecutors
have no affirmative duty to prosecute, even when the evidence
would justify prosecution.9 In all cases of bargained resolution we
might think that the ends of punishment and remedial action are
both served. True, the punishments may not be those prescribed in
the law and the remedial action is seemingly prospective rather than
retrospective. But such deals have been openly countenanced by
the courts and they are generally negotiated quite openly.
It is entirely plausible that we could make plea bargaining illegal,
with prosecutors subject to prosecution for making deals on
criminal charges. Or courts might simply refuse to accept the deals
prosecutors make. Many legal scholars and participants in the
American criminal justice system think it wrong to allow plea
bargaining. 10 One might support its use for pragmatic reasons
and yet have grave misgivings about it. Some scholars think the
analogous settlement process in civil suits subverts the purpose of
determining good legal rules for relevant behavior; settlement
forestalls a formal judgment, allows the parties to resolve their
dispute in private and off the record with no oversight by the public
8 Often the penalty is time served from arrest to trial plus, of course, conviction
on the lesser charge.
9 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.1, at 622
(2d ed. 1992) ("Even when it is clear that there exists evidence which is more than
sufficient to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecutor might nonetheless
decide not to charge a particular individual with a criminal offense.").
10 See e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L.
REV. 652, 652 (1981) ("[P]lea bargaining remains an inherently unfair and irrational
process, one that turns major treatment consequences upon a single tactical decision
irrelevant to any proper objective of criminal proceedings."); Albert W. Alschuler,
Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979) (noting that plea
bargaining "did not occur with any frequency until well into the nineteenth century");
DeanJ. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases, Prior
Records, and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17J. CRIM.JUsT. 253, 262 (1989) (discussing
evidence that the plea bargaining process results in harsher results for those unable
to afford a private lawyer);Joan L. McGregor, The Market Model of Plea Bargaining, 6
PUB. AFF. Q. 385, 386 (1992) (suggesting that "there are serious moral problems with
plea bargaining").
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eye, and may yield no precedents to guide the actions of others.11
Plea bargaining may produce similarly perverse misguidance for
others. Those who might commit certain types of crimes may infer
that they risk the bargain penalty, not the potentially much harsher
and perhaps more effectively deterrent penalty written into the law.
To decide whether plea bargaining is good under some moral
theory or principle requires assessment of its general effects,
especially its broad systemic effects. We cannot decide the issue
simply from consideration of a particular case, in which plea
bargaining is not inherently either right or wrong. But it is now
legally accepted in manyjurisdictions. The difference between plea
bargaining when it is legal and when it is illegal is conventional.
Illegal plea bargaining might count as blackmail. Legal plea
bargaining would not.
Perhaps the most striking way to make the point that we cannot
read values exclusively from facts is to put legal interactions into
game theoretic strategic form. This representation abstracts from
the substantive content of the interaction and focuses only on how
the parties rank the varied outcomes. Many interactions that seem
radically different morally are strategically identical. For example,
mutual advantage blackmail and ordinary exchange have the same
prisoner's dilemma structure. 12 Some moral theories (libertarian-
ism, utilitarianism, communitarianism, deontological and rationalist
rights theories) give very heavy moral weight to what people want;
virtually all give some weight despite occasional disclaimers. If we
bring this value into consideration, we may often find a clearly
moral resolution for certain abstract forms of interaction. Yet,
again, this runs against the apparent moral reading of the more fully
described cases.
James Lindgren has proposed a compelling claim for why we
should think the threats involved in plea bargaining and many other
contexts are not immoral, while those in ordinary blackmail cases
are.1 3 In the ordinary case, Lindgren argues that if I threaten to
11 SeeJules Coleman & Charles SilverJustice in Settlements, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y
102, 116-17 (1986) (stating the concern of some writers that "the policy of
encouraging settlements results in the underproduction of opinions and precedents");
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) ("A settlement will
... deprive a court of the occasion, and perhaps even the ability, to render an
interpretation.").
1 See infra part IV.
13 SeeJames Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 670,
717 (1984).
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reveal embarrassing information about you in order to exact
payment from you, I am using your chip, or the chip of the person
against whom you have committed adultery or some other black-
mailable act, for my gain. 14 In contrast, when the officers of the
court offer me a plea bargain, they are bargaining, as they should
be, with the public chip for the public good. The chief weakness in
Lindgren's claim is that he simply posits the chip argument as
inherently moral. Perhaps it is. But the argument lacks demonstra-
tion in some moral theory. From the mere fact that blackmail cases
fall into two categories, nothing follows for the rightness or
wrongness of either of those categories.
II. INSTiTUTIONAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS
Much of the discussion of blackmail is about whether there is
something inherently wrong in it, as though we could infer what the
law should be from looking at the characteristics of a particular
case. For an institutionalist, this approach is wrong; instead, we
should determine what overall result would be better and then
design the law to achieve that result. For example, in the law we
would not pretend to assess whether there was fault in an interac-
tion simply by analyzing the interaction (although many philoso-
phers do just this). Rather, we would want to create legal institu-
tions for handling the broad class of cases in which this interaction
fits. We might want quite different institutions, with different
evidentiary requirements and different kinds of sanction, for
criminal, tort, ordinary commercial contract, and family relations.
To say that a particular party to our interaction is wrong would
then, either explicitly or implicitly, be to say that our institutional
structure is right and that our legal institutions, properly applied,
produce a judgment that the relevant party is in the wrong.
15
To argue coherently, legal philosophers must be institutionalist.
Alternatively, they must defer wholly to judicial discretion in each
14 See id. at 702. Michael Gorr characterizes blackmail in the adultery-type case
as theft by the blackmailer from the party injured by the adultery. See Michael Gorr,
Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 43, 54 (1992). But the
money comes from the adulterer and there may be no sense in which the money is
owed to the party injured by the adultery. Labeling one party the victim of the
blackmail in such cases can be confusing.
15 For a more extensive discussion of the institutionalist approach, especially in
utilitarian theory, see RUSSELL HARDIN, MORALITY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON
115-207 (1988); Hardin, supra note 4, at 349-58; Russell Hardin, The Artificial Duties
of Contemporaty Professionals, 64 SOC. SERv. REV. 528-41 (1990).
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and every case. But then they have nothing more to say and they
may coherently remain silent. Many moral philosophers argue that
some action, X, is right tout court. But in an institutionalist account,
the rightness of action X will depend on how it interacts with other
actions.
Return to the example of plea bargaining. The arguments for
and against it are finally contingent. The question we must answer
is not whether a plea bargain is inherently right or wrong but
whether the justice system with plea bargaining is better than that
without, or vice versa. A utilitarian or rights theorist might
conclude either way. The utilitarian conclusion would depend on
the facts of how the different systems work out. For example, the
utilitarian might suppose that plea bargaining makes the justice
system work much more effectively, or she might suppose that plea
bargaining involves perverse changes in the incentives an accused
faces. Just because ninety-five percent of those accused in my
category of crime cop pleas, I may face much more vindictive and
rigorous treatment if I do not cop, even though I know, but cannot
easily prove to a court, that I am innocent.
16
Any claim to outlaw blackmail might seem weak if at the same
time the sale of embarrassing information on another to the press
remains legal. But the claim of mutual advantage from exchange
blackmail may be entirely upset by the instability of contractual
regulation of such blackmail. Consider a particular type of
blackmail case, exposure of homosexuality, which may be a modal
case in actual blackmail experience. The public wants to know and
will pay enough (as shown by willingness to buy more copies of
newspapers in which such an exposure is reported) to get the paper
to pay well for the relevant information. Suppose the target would
also pay well to block publication. We might stipulate that such
personal knowledge is protected against blackmail: I could not
cease to have such knowledge of you, but I would be prohibited
from passing it on to others. For this to be a credible and effective
protection of your privacy, the law might have to apply not only to
16 A common tale from the plea bargaining world is of the judge who has to
preside over the trial of an accused who has refused to cop a plea. Upon the guilty
verdict, the judge sentences the miscreant to the maximum term in prison, a far
longer term than what the unfortunate man would have received under the plea
bargain. The judge's explanation? "You take a little of my time, I take a little of
yours." There may be a genuine source for this tale, but I have heard it told of
particular judges in several parts of the country. It seems to be too good a line not
to be universally true.
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individuals who have private information on others but also to the
press. Unfortunately, the spillover effect of concern for the political
freedom of the press may be to block controls on press coverage of
facts that motivate blackmail and that might reasonably be pre-
sumed to be politically relevant. If freedom of the press trumps
privacy in certain cases, such as in the lives of public officials, and
if we cannot block payment for relevant information, then outlawing
blackmail penalizes the target by making it impossible for the target
to regain control of the information.
More generally, results that are not mutually advantageous can
follow from rules or regimes that are ex ante mutually advanta-
geous. We might therefore outlaw every offer to sell information
to someone likely to take offense or be harmed by its publication
even though the occasional offer might be mutually advantageous.
We could do so on the presumption that the errors involved in
sorting out the cases would be worse than the misfortune of
penalizing non-extortionate cases.
A common alternative to elevating argument to the institutional
or legal-rule level is the device followed in much of moral theory
historically, but especially during the vacuous heyday of intuitionism
during the first half of this century. 17 That device merely requires
intuiting whether the rule applied to a case produces the right or
the wrong result morally.1 8 Intuitionism constantly threatens to
undermine legal argument.
In legal argument, one might simply take the case law as
somehow representative of moral truth, as though courts and judges
were struggling to find the objective truth and could be trusted to
come increasingly close to it over many trials. It is true that case
law can inform theory by displaying varied possibilities that no
theorist alone could expect to invent. But no theory can simply
treat extant case law as a body of facts to be taken as morally or
even legally correct. Case law is not even consistent; it changes over
time, and many laws are arguably conventional, not moral resolu-
17 Intuitionism, which nearly destroyed moral theory, is roughly equivalent to
former President George Bush's pandering remark, as chief officer of the Constitu-
tion, that desecration of the American flag was a gutlevel thing with him. See George
Will, The Flag Dispute: Individualism Redux, NEWSDAY, July 3, 1989, at 43 ("President
George Bush says he feels 'viscerally' about flag-burning.").
18 In a typical move, Gorr says of one of his intuitions that, although it is clear
that the intuition is correct, it is hard to explain why. See Gorr, supra note 14, at 46
n.8.
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tions or legally deducible resolutions (as in the slow adoption of
plea bargaining).
The tendency to test legal and moral principles against the case
law may be exacerbated by the urge to find a moral account that
explains the actual law. In both legal and moral argument, one
might take one's own instant conclusions as right and then find a
theory that fits the supposed truth. As theorists have plausibly done
from time immemorial, one who has a reasonably rich moral theory
might let intuitions and theory fight it out (although there is some
problem of identifying the referee) to find truth somewhere
between them. This ages-long struggle is lately often attributed to
John Rawls with his "reflective equilibrium" as his contribution to
so-called moral methodology.
19
While we may not be able to escape intuitions entirely, we
cannot give a compelling account that stands very heavily on
piecemeal intuitions about the substantive rightness or goodness of
particular actions or results. If we cannot back our piecemeal
intuitions with theory or principle, the time has come to tend to
theory.
III. THE COMPLEX NATURE OF INTERACTION
The so-called paradox of blackmail is that people can do
particular things which are legal but which add up to an illegal
result. In a twist on an old conundrum, in the law two rights can
make a wrong:20 the law makes wrong what is not prima facie
wrong.
On a superficial level, similar paradoxes seemingly pervade the
law. It may be perfectly legal to own a firearm and even to fire it.
It may nevertheless be illegal to kill you with it. My actions of
acquiring and then firing a gun were both legitimate. How can it
be illegitimate that you happen to be dead as a result? Surely there
is not really a paradox here. The law is concerned not merely with
specific kinds of actions but, far more significantly, with the
19 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971); see also John Rawls, The
Independence of Moral Theoty, in 48 PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 5-22 (1975) (discussing reflective equilibrium and moral
theory).20 Joel Feinberg holds that blackmail is usually wrong and ought to be illegal, but
also claims that it can be right in cases in which the target has done a wrong that is
not illegal. See JOEL FEINBERG, 4 HARMLESS WRONGDOING 245-49 (1988). Two
wrongs may not make a right, but evidently they can block a charge of illegality.
Moral logic in this area is apparently a mess.
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consequences of various actions. Indeed, an action theorist might
spell out my actions in inordinate detail, while a court of law might
simply strive to determine whether I committed murder. Without
the murder, there would be no case at law. The notion of murder
seems to have both deontological (action) and consequentialist
(outcome) connotations. It predates the intellectual distinction
between these two by millennia.
There is a further general reason for why, in the law, we cannot
meaningfully think of actions in the piecemeal way that lies behind
the notion of the paradox of blackmail. The paradoxical result is
typical of consequential analyses of actions in interactive contexts.
In such contexts, it is misleading to say I choose an action. Rather,
I choose a strategy. In casual talk, choosing an action often tends
to imply choosing an outcome. For example, by your action of
flipping a light switch, you produce light. But when I choose a
strategy, I choose one array of possible outcomes over other arrays
of perhaps quite different outcomes. If I am sensible, I will
generally choose my strategy in light of what strategies I think you
and relevant others will choose.
21
Choosing a strategy is often risky in the sense that one strategy
may include in its range of possible outcomes both better and worse
outcomes than those included in the range of an alternative
strategy. It is not inherently wrong to gamble on getting better
outcomes while risking the chance of worse ones. We do it
repeatedly every day we are not comatose. But the law may be used
to restrict the range of possible strategy choices in order to produce
results that are better by some moral or practical criterion. It may
then be legally wrong to make certain strategy choices, even though
it is not inherently wrong to do so in principle. Arguments that are
exclusively about kinds of action are therefore likely to provide
wrongheaded reasons for justifying laws.
Strong moral claims about piecemeal actions in interactive
contexts are more generally problematic. One response to
arguments against outlawing blackmail is to ask why one cannot
threaten to do what one has the full legal right to do (such as pass
relevant information to the press). 22 In some moral arguments it
is even plausible to claim one can be in the right to threaten some-
thing, which if carried out, would be wrong. In the moral criticism
21 See HARDIN, supra note 15, at 68-70.
22 SeeJames Lindgren, Blackmail: On Waste Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA
L. REV. 597, 598 (1989).
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of nuclear deterrence, it is often asserted that it is wrong to
threaten what it would be wrong to do (to immolate cities full of
innocents, including young children).23 This is often asserted
axiomatically, as though it were a basic or directly intuited moral
principle. But in actual practice, one cannot separate the threat and
what makes it credible from the end to be achieved. What makes
it credible is compelling evidence that it would be carried out with
some significant probability. If such threatening produces massively
good results, it is hard, even lunatic, to say that the threatening is
wrong. Perhaps nuclear deterrence has never produced massively
good results, but this is an empirical matter whose resolution cannot
rescue the moral axiom. Splitting the threat from its larger end,
even given the possibility of a worse outcome if the threat fails to
deter and retaliation follows, is conceptually, and therefore morally,
perverse.
24
In sum, we cannot know morality in the law when we see it
unless we have a lot of theory and legal knowledge to bring to bear.
In particular, we cannot know of many forms of interaction that
they are wrong in themselves. They can be wrong only as an
implication of a theory and of certain conventional resolutions in
the law.
IV. STRATEGIC STRUCTURE OF EXCHANGE BLACKMAIL
What is the structure of the blackmail interaction? Unfortunate-
ly, there may be many structures. One can blackmail another not
to do something, one can blackmail in the public interest, one can
blackmail in one's own interest. We may represent the interactions
game theoretically with payoff structures that abstract from the
specific content of any particular instance of blackmail. The specific
content of the outcomes can vary enormously while the structure of
preferences remains the same. But even the structure of preferenc-
es can vary, as it does in the matrices represented below.
23A wrongful intentions principle is assumed by ANTHONY KENNY, THE LOGIC OF
DETERRENCE 45-52 (1985), and by JOHN FINNIS ET AL., NUcLEAR DETERRENCE,
MORALITY AND REALISM 77-86 (1987). See generally GREGORY S. KAvKA, MORAL
PARADOXES OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (1987); Thomas Donaldson, Nuclear Deterrence
and Self-Defense, 95 ETHICS 537 (1985); Steven Lee, The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence:
Hostage Holding and Consequences, 95 ETHICS 549 (1985).
24 See Russell Hardin, Deterrence and Moral Theory, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
DETERRENCE, AND DISARMAMENT 161,161-63 (CanadianJournal of Philosophy, Supp.
Vol. 12, David Copp ed., 1986).
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Consider two possible blackmail games in which the potential
blackmailer has information that another person would rather have
suppressed. In order to avoid the air of persuasive moral definition,
I will refer to the person blackmailed not as the victim but as the
target of the blackmail. In both games, the blackmailer has legal
right to possess and disseminate the information, for example, to
the press. In the first game, the blackmailer can suppress informa-
tion that would be given publicity if the press were to receive it;
however, the press will not pay for the information. The target
would be sorely embarrassed or even harmed by such publicity and
would willingly pay to get the blackmailer not to release it. The
blackmailer has, however, nothing to gain from carrying out her
threat of exposure if the target does not pay, since the press will not
pay either.
In the second game, the press would pay for the information
and the target would pay as much as the press plus a bit more. This
game could be played with or without an enforceable contract that
insures against dissemination of the information after the target has
paid blackmail. Default by the blackmailer might entail a penalty
that would exceed the sum of the blackmail payment and any
benefit gained by further release of the information. With contrac-
tual enforcement, the law allows blackmail but it also protects the
interests of the target in keeping the blackmailer's information
suppressed. This mirrors standard legal protection of contracts
more generally.
25
These two games are represented in game matrices I and II
below. The payoffs in these games are strictly ordinal, with 1 as the
best outcome for the relevant player and 4 as the worst. The left
payoff in each cell goes to the row player, the blackmailer; the right
payoff goes to the target. We might tentatively refer to the lower
left cell in each matrix as the status quo ante: The blackmailer has
the information but the target has made no payment.
25 Even some contracts, comparable to blackmail contracts, for suppressing
information are protected. See Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the
Second Paradox of Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1665-68 (1993) (discussing the
economics of secrets and the contracts that control them.)
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GAME I
BLACKMAIL WITH No PAYMENT FOR PUBLICATION
Target
Not Pay Pay
Give Info to Press 2,3 1,4
Blackmailer
Suppress Info 2,1 1,2
GAME II
BLACKMAIL WITH PAYMENT FOR PUBLICATION
Target
Not Pay Pay
Give Info to Press 3,3 1,4
Blackmailer
Suppress Info 4,1 2,2
Let us consider what narrowly rational or self-interested players
would do in these games. Without contract enforcement the games
pose severe commitment problems. How can the target be sure the
blackmailer will not release the information even after blackmail is
paid? Indeed, in the first game, how can the target even be sure the
blackmailer will release the information if blackmail is not paid?
There is no incentive for the blackmailer to do so once the
blackmail gambit has failed. The only incentive the blackmailer has
with respect to releasing the information in these games is that it
gives the blackmailer a very nearly costless threat in the sense that
it is almost costless to carry out. Hence, without contract enforce-
ment, these two games are very unstable. Neither party has clear
incentives.
In the second game, with contract enforcement, the incentives
are quite clear. Negotiation with an enforceable contract gives the
blackmailer a very clear incentive to suppress the information if
paid blackmail, and the prospect of payment from the press gives
her very clear incentive to sell to the press if payment is not made.
Note that Game II represents the standard ordinal prisoner's
dilemma.
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Law can enter to stabilize the blackmail interaction in at least
two ways. It can be used to criminalize or fine the act of blackmail
in order to induce a potential blackmailer to weigh only the benefits
of releasing information without the benefit of negotiating with the
potential target. Alternatively, it can be used to enforce any deals
the blackmailer and the target make, thereby permitting them to
secure a mutually beneficial outcome. The blackmailer can
unilaterally force the outcome 3,3 in Game II, but the target has
incentive to enter a contract that secures the 2,2 outcome.
Why is blackmail wrong? It cannot be wrong because it is
somehow wrong for the target to pay to protect her reputation
against the truth or even a falsehood. It seems to be broadly
permissible for individuals and firms to expend resources on their
reputations, even on puffery and false claims for reliability. Perhaps
blackmail is wrong primarily because we have de facto chosen not
to back it with enforcement of contracts for blackmail. In general,
making particular kinds of contractual agreements unenforceable is
an effective device for blocking those transactions. If such contracts
are not enforceable, the interaction is woefully unstable and subject
to a double-cross extortion. Even if such contracts are enforceable,
the target might still view the general situation as radically unstable,
because one blackmailer might soon be followed by others, each
fully in the legal right. The payoff to one blackmailer would then
be a sunk cost when the second blackmailer's offer is considered.
Perhaps this grievous instability in the blackmail system, even when
it is restricted to exchange blackmail, makes it ex ante desirable to
have the law prohibit blackmail. But we could want to outlaw
exchange blackmail for this reason even if we do not think such
blackmail is morally wrong.
Perhaps there is disagreement on the rightness of keeping
certain information private. Many of us firmly believe individuals
should have legal protection of their privacy in some realm while
many just as firmly believe no one should have legal protection of
privacy in that realm. 26 The law is ambivalent. It does not protect
privacy, but it criminalizes blackmail. Michael Gorr argues that such
26 Compare Ira Glasser, Supreme Court No Longer Protects Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
24, 1993, § 4, at 16 (letter to the editor from Executive Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union arguing for a restoration of the constitutional right to privacy) with
John H. Awerdick, A Free Speech Issue, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 24, 1993, § 4, at 16 (letter to
the editor from an attorney arguing that privacy rights should trump free speech
rights only when disclosure would result in physical or economic harm).
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inconsistency in the case of blackmail is merely pragmatic: we
would (and should) outlaw the selling of information on others if we
could only do so without severe costs.2 7 Hence, the paradox of
blackmail is only apparent. It is only pragmatic considerations that
stand in the way of a fully consistent general law of blackmail.
But Gorr appears to be mistaken. In some cases there cannot
be anything wrong in informing the public of otherwise private
information. For example, if voters think candidates for public
office should be judged in part on their loyalty to their spouses or
on actions in their youth that might provide information on their
character, then those voters have at least political grounds to know
these things. Suppose a candidate does not report the relevant facts
but that a former lover or distant associate offers to sell the
information to the press. We could suppose constitutional
protections of the press apply in such political cases.28  What
might constitute tortious slander or libel against a private citizen
without any public role beyond being a voter would not be tortious
action against a politician. This is not merely a matter of the costs
of regulating cases of exposure of politicians; it is also a matter of
the functional value of such exposure. The exposure is arguably
right, not wrong.
To say it is right to expose politicians to the (perhaps petty)
scrutiny of the press might be taken to imply that it is right for the
relevant information to become public and wrong for it to be
suppressed. If this were true, then candidates for public office
might be thought to have an affirmative duty to tell us what the
press might otherwise have to pay to find out for us. Should then-
President George Bush have told the American electorate the details
of his reputed affair?29 Should then-Governor Bill Clinton have
"come clean with the American people," as his opponents insist-
ed?3 0 To say it was legally wrong for certain information to be
suppressed seems to imply that Bush, Clinton, and relevant others
2 7 See Gorr, supra note 14, at 44.
28 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that
a state cannot award damages to a public official in a libel action unless the plaintiff
can show that the defamatory statement "was made with actual malice-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").
29 See Bush Angrily Denies a Report of an Affair, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1992, at A14
(discussing generally the then-President's alleged relationship with Jennifer
Fitzgerald).io Robert G. Beckel, Is Clinton Getting a Free Press Ride? Give Me a Break, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, at M2 (quoting Vice President Dan Quayle).
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were legally wrong to suppress it. Perhaps one would accept this
conclusion while supposing it too difficult to enforce a law mandat-
ing exposure. But it seems plausible that we would actually prefer
legal rules permitting exposure and payment for relevant informa-
tion, but not requiring self-revelation. We might think this the legal
system that would work best, the system that we would agree to ex
ante, because it would be mutually advantageous.
For certain other categories of revelation, similar arguments
prevail: one can permissibly do things that one is not required to
do. This readily follows as a possibility in a mutual advantage
theory. It can happen, at least in principle, that a legal rule either
blocking an act or requiring the same act would be too unenforce-
able or too costly to be justified by what it would achieve. But in a
mutual advantage theory, once we have reached this ambivalent
conclusion, we have no further ground on which to declare it either
legally wrong for you to do it or legally right for you to be required
to do it. In a law and economics theory grounded in mutual
advantage, any argument that supposedly hinges on the immediate
rightness or wrongness of blackmail in a particular class of cases is
beside the point. Outside such law and economics theories and
outside any other general moral theory, arguments about the
immediate rightness or wrongness of blackmail have no point.
Their bottom-line conclusions may be consistent with some moral
theory, but arguments for them are of no interest unless they can
be related to a compelling general theory.
To complete this discussion, note that the general moral theory
must be brought to bear at the institutional level, as legal philoso-
phy must also beA1 It cannot be immediately obvious that the law
should take a position on whose chip a particular bit of information
is; this assertion would have to be inferred from more general
principles. Presumably, most of us do not want to say that private
information on candidates for public office is, no matter what its
content, the public's chip. But we may also not want to block the
public or the press from using such information. Mutual advantage
theorists could be ambivalent on what the law should be for the
empirical reason that they do not know which system is ex ante
better. Rights theorists might be ambivalent because they do not
yet have good arguments for why the right should fall one way
rather than the other. They cannot instantly identify the right that
31 See supra part II.
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trumps. Kantians presumably face the usual difficulty of deducing
a practical imperative from their very general categorical impera-
tive.32 In these theories, the question at issue is some variant of
the following: When do considerations of privacy trump various
needs, rights, or reasons to know?
V. BLACKMAIL FOR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE
As noted earlier, most of law and economics is grounded in an
explicit or implicit moral principle of mutual advantage. At first
consideration, this principle might seem to allow exchange
blackmail because such blackmail is to the mutual advantage of the
parties to it. Against this quick conclusion, however, one might
conclude that the legalization of such blackmail would, ex ante,
make people generally worse off even though it would, in a
particular application, make the two parties to it better off. The
external and incentive effects of having such blackmail as a legal
possibility might override the apparent benefits to its immediate
parties. Let us suppose, however, that the legal possibility of
exchange blackmail would not have overriding external or incentive
effects. It follows that, under the principle of mutual advantage,
exchange blackmail is acceptable.
To see whether blackmail genuinely fits a mutual advantage
account, one might put the outcomes in Game II in a Paretian
space. If 4,1 is the status quo ante, then movement to 2,2 is not
Pareto efficient, 33 because that move reduces the welfare of the
target. This might seem to yield an economic argument against
allowing blackmail. But the status quo ante might be thought to
include certain resource values, including the blackmailer's resource
of information. Is it somehow naturally right to block the use of the
blackmailer's resource?
Suppose we block it only to the extent that the blackmailer
cannot threaten the target with exposure, although she can still
legitimately sell her information to the press or to the target. The
correct view of the status quo ante between the blackmailer and the
32 Kant's categorical imperative states that "I ought never to act except in such a
way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MoRALS 70 (H.J. Paton trans., 1964) (1948).
ss An outcome is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible outcome at which
all members are at least as well off and at least one is strictly better off. See B.
Lockwood, Pareto Efficiency, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 811-13 (John Eatwell et al. eds.,
1987).
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target seems now to be the status quo of the blackmailer's potential-
ly selling the information to the press, which leaves the target very
badly off in her third preference. Putting this status quo at the
origin in a Paretian space yields only one move that is Pareto
efficient, namely to the outcome 2,2 in which there is a successful
blackmail. From the status quo of 3,3, neither player would be
willing to switch strategies unilaterally. Yet the status quo is Pareto
dominated by the 2,2 outcome, which can be reached only if both
players switch strategies together.
Game theoretically, however, we need not even be concerned
with the nominal status quo ante. All that matters is the strategic
opportunities available to the players. Because play is spread over
time and coordinated, the 4,1 outcome is virtually blocked-the
blackmailer is likely to release the information eventually. Because
of contractual enforcement, the 1,4 outcome is virtually blocked.
Hence, the players face only the choice between 2,2 and 3,3. From
this reduced set, 2,2 is the mutual advantage choice.
Against the apparent conclusion of this argument that blackmail
is mutually beneficial and therefore acceptable, Lindgren argues
that the blackmailer illegitimately uses and profits from the wrong
party's chip in this deal.3 4 This argument sounds relatively persua-
sive when it is addressed to the use of official power to extort
payments from people. Officials of the criminal justice system
should not enrich themselves by using the public's authority to
threaten you with criminal sanction so that you will pay them or
otherwise reward them to avoid the sanction. In addition, it is
widely believed that organized crime in the United States has long
depended on police connivance, at least at the local level.s5
Allowing potential criminals and actual miscreants to pay their way
out of harsher punishments probably does not effectively deter
these actors from criminal acts. The standard argument for police
protection is mutual advantage, as in Hobbes's account.3 6 Allow-
34 See Lindgren, supra note 13, at 702.
35 See, e.g., State v. Hess, 464 U.S. 995 (1983) (involving a police chief convicted
of corruption for selling confidential information to a reputed organized crime
figure); United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1982) (involving an
organized crime operation that had been assisted by the control of members of the
sheriff's organized crime unit); EdwinJ. Delatre, Character and Cops: Ethics in Policing,
88 MICH. L. REV. 1698, 1705 (1990) ("Historically, police corruption has been closely
related to ... organized crime enterprises .... ").
36 See THOMAS HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN (1651) (ch. 13-15) (suggesting that civil laws
enforced by governments are enacted to protect people from the evils associated with
living in a "state of nature").
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ing distortion of the system in order to enrich some of its officers
is unlikely to serve mutual advantage, and should therefore be
blocked.
s 7
But whose chip does the blackmailer use in an exchange
blackmail? She has full legal right to the information she has
obtained, and she has full legal right to sell it to the press. The
potential blackmailer in an exchange blackmail, oddly, seems to be
on the same footing as an arbitrage agent or a retail seller of
someone else's products. Suppose that I know very much about A
and very much about B. In particular, I know that they would have
great interest in making a deal. But neither of them knows enough
about the other to know to deal. I can make a great profit for
myself by getting them to deal through me as an intermediary,
perhaps even while keeping A and B ignorant of each other. A large
fraction of business transactions and the overwhelming majority of
consumer purchases must follow this pattern. In Lindgren's
vocabulary, I profit from the use of A's and B's chips. In the cases
of the threatened use of official power, the Lindgren rule may be
compelling-I should not use the threatened power of the criminal
legal system to get you to pay me for keeping quiet about your
activities. But in the world of preferences and consumptions, there
is nothing wrong with my use of A's and B's resources to make a
profit if it is mutually advantageous. Or, rather, one should say that
we ought not make it legally wrong because doing so would prevent
mutually beneficial transactions, some of which are enormously
advantageous to us. In my retailing goods from A to B, my chip is
information, and in the law it may be fully and rightly mine so that
I have legal right to what I can produce from it.
Unlike a threat of pure harm that does not directly benefit the
person causing the harm, blackmail may be a genuine case of
exchange. The blackmailer may have the prospect of a significant
reward for revealing her information to the press. She merely
offers to sell it to someone who values keeping the information
private more than the press values its publication, and who
therefore might pay more for it than the press would.
37 One might retort that having a police system that works well is not to the
mutual advantage because it does not benefit organized (or disorganized) crime. At
the institutional stage ofjudging whether to have a good police and criminal justice
system, however, we might all agree with Hobbes that, without strong order, we will
not prosper. If we do not prosper, neither will those in organized crime.
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One might wish to outlaw blackmail on efficiency grounds, as
some scholars in law and economics have argued, because it gives
incentives to do perversely unproductive things.38 This argument
does not so clearly apply to exchange blackmail. A newspaper that
pays a reporter to dig up newsworthy material on someone likely
does so in order to increase circulation and advertising revenue.
One might object to what the newspaper produces but it would be
silly to say it is unproductive. By analogy, a blackmailer is essential-
ly a free agent who sells the same material to that newspaper, and
so also is productive. Both the reporter and the free agent help
produce something consumers want; indeed, they may be better at
this than General Motors. Nevertheless, overall efficiency reasons
might dictate a law prohibiting blackmail that covered cases of
mutual advantage or exchange blackmail. Such a law might make
efficient sense if evidential or strategic considerations made it very
difficult to identify exchange blackmail and to exempt it from
coverage. But this argument, to be validated, requires a substantial
empirical study-it does not simply follow a priori. And if it holds,
it does not turn on the moral nature of exchange blackmail, which
could readily be acknowledged as morally acceptable even though
not legally exempt from penalty.
Richard Posner says blackmail of the exchange variety has no
social product and should therefore be criminalized 39 This is a
very odd conclusion. Much of what I do has no social product (for
instance, I consume, I waste time), but surely it should not be
criminalized. Perhaps Posner means that it has net social costs. If
so, we might be better off, considered ex ante, with prohibiting even
exchange blackmail. But this would be true only if the losses from
blackmail outweigh the likely costs of enforcing a law against it.
38 See Ronald H. Coase, Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 671 (1988) (noting that
when transaction costs are considered, even purely redistributive blackmail is
unproductive); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail. An Economic
Analysis of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1849, 1849-50 (1993) (stating that while
blackmail laws were not enacted to further a specific economic rationale, the laws in
fact enhance efficiency); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private
Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-43 (1975) (suggesting that blackmail is
illegal as a result of society's decision to grant a public monopoly in the enforcement
of criminal law).
39 See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW 601 (4th ed. 1992). Most
of his discussion concerns blackmailing a person who would be legally incriminated
by the evidence one might reveal. See id. at 600-02. This class of blackmail problems
easily fits Lindgren's rule.
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We could conceivably outlaw certain kinds of arbitrage or retail
trade for reasons having to do with their effects on the larger
society. Medieval philosophers rated trade as an occupation of little
respect because it is supposedly not productive. Anyone with a
sense of the beneficial role of information in the economic life of
modern societies must think trade quite productive-without it there
could hardly be much production of any other kind. Hence, it
would be preposterous to suppose there is something inherently
wrong with the strategic structure of retail sales or arbitrage that
makes all such activity wrong or not worthy of legal support. If we
are to make mutually beneficial blackmail illegal on the ground of
its immorality in some sense, we will have to make the case on
something other than the strategic structure of the relationship.
Blackmail of the type in Game II involves merely the strategic
structure of exchange, in which the action of choosing the coopera-
tive exchange strategy cannot plausibly be seen as inherently wrong.
Why does Lindgren's principle seem to apply in one context (the
use of institutional position to extort personal benefit from
blackmail) and not in another (my use of your productivity to make
a profit for me)? A mutual advantage theorist can give a relatively
simple answer for why these contexts yield different moral injunc-
tions. A system of justice or a labor union may work best for the
benefit of all relevant persons if it is not put to extraneous use for
personal gain. Hence, the regime of "no such extraneous use" is
the mutual advantage regime. The generalized use of others'
productivity for one's own personal profit, however, may well be
mutually beneficial for everyone. Hence, the regime of such
profiteering may be good.
Some instances involving trade secrets can also be fit into a
mutual advantage theory. Suppose I know how you succeed so
remarkably at marketing some product, and suppose I can give this
legally unprotected knowledge to a competitive firm. I make an
offer to you that sounds like blackmail. You put me on a generous
retainer as an "adviser" and give me attractive stock options in your
firm, and I keep my knowledge secret. If your competitor adopts
your technique, you are immediately to fire me as adviser and,
without action at all on your part, my stock options become far less
attractive as your firm loses market share.
In this trade-secret case, we might think there is nothing wrong
with my actions. I have the legal right to go to your competitor and
to negotiate favorable terms with her. All I do is give you a chance
to salvage your interests by matching or topping the likely price
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your competitor would pay. The fact that there is nothing illegal
about my actions might be the ground for thinking there is nothing
wrong with them. This would be the view of a Hobbesian or other
positive law theorist.
Some legal theorists, however, might suppose there is nothing
illegal about my actions in large part because there is nothing wrong
with them. The view that the right or the good determines the law
might often yield a correct historical account of how a particular law
came to be what it is. But unless the principle of rightness or
goodness is very broadly conceived, this view is conspicuously false
to the historical facts of many laws. Consider what may be an
especially provocative case, the law of murder. We may say murder
is inherently wrong and therefore it is illegal (or is likely to be
illegal). But this claim is a circular cheat. Most who think murder
is inherently wrong do not think killing is inherently wrong. To
characterize certain killings as murder and others as not requires a
relatively detailed moral theory or principle. Today the law in many
jurisdictions counts killing in a duel as murder,40 whereas not long
ago such killing was a matter of honor. Morality may have both led
and followed the law in this transformation. When Cardinal
Richelieu enforced the ban against dueling in France (renewed in
a severe edict in early 1626), his concern was evidently with the
generally harmful effects of the system of personal honor that
burdened the aristocratic class, not with the directly inferred
wrongness of killing in particular duels. Indeed, he used execution,
of the comte de Bouteville and his second, inJune 1627, a mere five
weeks after the comte's duel.4 1
Part of the problem of supposing that the right or the good
determines the law is that conceptions of the right and the good
change over time. For example, medieval jurists thought charging
interest on loans was wrong and called it usury.42 Jurists today
40 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-23 (1991) (stating that the death of a person
within the state resulting from an out-of-state duel imposes liability for murder upon
the other participant); State v. Tally, 33 A. 181, 182 (Del. Oyer & Terminer 1886)
(stating that if one party is killed in a duel, the other party is guilty of murder). But
see People ex rel. Terry v. Bartlett, 14 Cal. 651, 653 (1860) (holding that a fatal duel
is not murder within California statutes, but rather a special offense).
41 See VIcTOR-L. TAPIt, FRANCE IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIII AND RICHELIEU 163-65
(D. McN. Lockie trans., Macmillan Press 1974) (1952). On Tapi6's reading of
Richelieu's memoirs, Richelieu was gravely troubled by this episode, but still thought
his action necessary for the good of France (presumably meaning the good of the
king).42 See Robert H. Nelson, Private Rights to Government Actions: How Modern Property
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generally do not think charging interest is wrong and do not call it
usury, although somejurisdictions place upper limits on the interest
rates that may be charged.43 Part of the reason for the change is
a better causal understanding of the effects of allowing interest.
And part of it is the rejection of supposed scriptural warrants for
calling interest wrong."
The changed view of dueling may very well be a change not
merely in causal understanding but more significantly in causal
capacities. The state has become capable of handling certain
offenses and has, in Lindgren's term, taken the chip of enforcement
out of the hands of individuals. But many of the offenses that led
to duels, such as the frivolous duel of Eugene Onegin,45 are now
virtually ignored by many states. If there is enforcement, it is still
at the individual level, but it is now presumably far less grievous in
its exactions. Richelieu's view that the duel was disruptive to the
general good is in part implicitly a view that the conventional
evaluation of the seriousness of the offenses that gave rise to duels
was radically too severe. Changing the law may have changed the
conventional valuations as well.
VI. BLACKMAIL IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
One might also allow blackmail in cases concerning the public
interest. Consider the experience of former Vice President Spiro
Agnew. Agnew reputedly had taken large bribes from contractors
in Maryland while he was governor, some of which continued to be
paid on an installment plan while he was Vice President.46 Federal
prosecutors had damning evidence. 47 Unfortunately, a trial would
Rights Evolve, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV., 361, 384.
43 See, e.g., ARK. CONsT. art. 19, § 13 (limiting the interest rate on any contract to
5% per year, but allowing a seventeen percent rate for consumer loans and credit
sales); ALA. CODE § 8-8-1 (1992) (limiting the interest rate on money loans to 6% per
year, or 8% if the loan is through a written contract);.
44 See Ezekiel 18:8; Luke 6:34-35.
45 See ALEXANDER PUSHKIN, EUGENE ONEGIN (1833) (ch. 6).
46 
See RICHARD M. COHEN & JULES WrrCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY: THE
INVESTIGATION AND RESIGNATION OF VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW 349 (1974)
(quoting Agnew's acknowledgement of the existence, and his denial of the veracity,
of allegations that he and his agents "received payments from consulting engineers
doing business with the state of Maryland during the period [he] was governor").
4 'See id. at 346 (stating that the government had evidence of payments to Agnew
by two engineering firms from the early 1960s through 1972, and that the
government's witnesses were prepared to testify that they made direct payments to
Agnew).
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have taken a long time, and many feared that President Richard
Nixon would soon be impeached by the House and perhaps
removed by the Senate to make Agnew, a reputed criminal,
president. An alternative consequence of taking Agnew to trial, also
arguably very bad, was the possibility of much greater reluctance in
the Senate to remove Nixon if Agnew would then become president.
The Justice Department prosecutors evidently concluded that they
should blackmail Agnew out of concern for the national interest,
and they offered to guarantee not to bring his case to trial in return
for his resignation as Vice President.
48
The tough aspect of the Agnew case is to decide how it counts.
One might conclude that it was blackmail but nevertheless a morally
correct action, even though of dubious legal validity. Indeed, it
makes sense to say that it was arguably moral even if it was literally
illegal. Fairly broad prosecutorial discretion is generally legal.
49
What would it mean to make the Agnew prosecutors' action a
matter of illegal blackmail? It is difficult to imagine who could have
prosecuted the Justice Department prosecutors; their acts may have
fallen only under their own department's jurisdiction, and the
department must have countenanced their own agent's behavior.
Congress could have intervened against them, but Congress might
readily be expected to pass on the opportunity to uphold the law
even while striving to impeach a president for not upholding it.
Was it blackmail? Were the prosecutors not simply acting in the
public interest, or playing the public's chip on behalf of the public?
Yes, but. The law may define the ways in which prosecutors should
act in the public interest. It need not leave this definition up to its
agents. The whole strategy of law is to place intermediate institu-
tions between individual judgment and whatever purposes are to be
served by law. Perhaps Agnew's potential prosecutors were
utilitarians who simply thought the world with Agnew out of office
was better than the world with him in office and facing trial. But
the law does not generally require one to follow a particular moral
theory or broad assessment. Rather it prescribes certain acts and
proscribes others. The law may be much more precise and detailed
than its background purposes, but it may also be less exact in some
contexts, especially in situations involving unanticipated problems
such as Agnew's.
50
48 See id. at 236-37, 342-43.
49 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
50 See Russell Hardin, My University's Yacht: Morality and the Rule of Law, in
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Agnew's case is reputedly not unusual-public officials may often
be blackmailed in similar fashion. Consider the more recent case
of Sol Wachtler who, as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, was
the highest judge of the State of New York (and so a distant
successor to Benjamin Cardozo). Wachtler was involved in an ugly
attempt at blackmail coupled with threats of kidnaping.51 The
U.S. attorneys handling his case considered confronting him with
their then-circumstantial evidence to make him resign as judge.
52
They feared that surveillance would eventually lead the judge to halt
his actions before hard evidence was generated, "and then you'd
end up with a secret nut running the court system of New York."53
In the end, of course, they trapped and charged Wachtler, and he
subsequently resigned.54 Perhaps there was pleasing irony in the
potential use of blackmail to punish a blackmailer. But the public
whose chip is played in such cases might rightly wonder whether its
interests are well served by the promise of special treatment for
felonious public officials, which allows such officials, but not the
rest of us, to escape more severe punishment merely by resigning
their offices.
VII. CAVEATS AND OTHER MORALITIES
It is often said or implied that law and economics is grounded
in a moralized view of what kinds of action count as acceptable.
55
By ruling out certain kinds of action, scholars of law and economics
reach conclusions that may seem not to depend on any criterion but
efficiency or some relative. If I aim missiles with high explosives at
my neighbor's home, our bargaining positions change, for I can now
extort a larger share of the total profit from our joint endeavors.
We still may agree to use our combined properties in the most
profitable ways as we would in a normal Coasian bargain over
NOMOS 36: THE RULE OF LAw (Randy E. Barnett & Ian Shapiro eds., forthcoming
1993) (manuscript at 3, on file with author) (noting that "although the legal system
may have capacities for discovering facts... it may also face constraints on gathering
and using information").
51 See Lucinda Franks, To Catch a judge: How the F.B.I. Tracked Sol Wachtler, NEW
YORKER, Dec. 21, 1992, at 58, 58-60.
52 See id. at 61.
53 Id.
54 See id. at 66.
55 See e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 163,
166 (1990) (asserting that moral concerns may legitimately underlie a general wealth
maximization approach).
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property rights, but, with my missiles in place, I get more of the
profit.
Yet our production might still be affected by the introduction
of the threatened harm. Some of our joint resources go into
producing the weapons that are then used not to increase produc-
tion but only to shift distribution of profits. Hence, we are likely to
produce less for the market but to allocate more of the total profits
to me. Finally, I may even use my capacity to deliver harm to extort
more from our joint production than merely the maximal amount
of profits; for instance, I may force you to give me resources. At
this point, the Coasian system has broken down. We are no longer
in a world of consensual exchange and production-we are in the
world of the mafia and of international military relations. Ronald
Coase himself seemingly grants that the possibility of non-produc-
tive harmful conduct undercuts his analysis of social cost.
56
An actor threatening a harm who derives no direct benefit from
its imposition subverts social cost analysis because the Coasian
framework is grounded in voluntarist assumptions. But if we back
off from the explicit argument of Coase, we may suppose his
principle is the voluntarist principle of mutual advantage. 57 The
use of blackmail, which involves the threat of a harm, can violate
this principle, although it need not and does not in exchange
blackmail. Coase could, consistently with his general argument,
allow state intervention to block the use of harms that are not
mutually advantageous. Indeed, such a move is necessary to enable
people to reach mutually advantageous outcomes and to avoid
falling into a mutually destructive Hobbesian state of nature.
58
His whole analysis of the problem of social cost takes place, after all,
in the context of a given set of rights assignments that are presum-
ably backed by adequate state power to secure them. To pull the
possibility of bombing my neighbor out of my hat at the moment of
our Coasian negotiation over the use of our properties is illicit,
because that issue, whether we allow use of destructive threats, has
already been settled before we bargain and only therefore do we
have reason to bargain.
From the sanguine world of Coasian bargaining, turn to the
grim world of threats backed by nuclear weapons. In that world
56 See Coase, supra note 38, at 656-57.
57 See Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: Hobbes, Coase, and Others 8-11
(Sept. 6, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
58 See id. at 4-5.
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there is no prior resolution on the use of violent extortion, in part
because there is no overarching international government. 59 The
term nuclear blackmail has been used chiefly to describe cases in
which nuclear superiority is, or potentially is, used to extort some
kind of concession. 60 It is typically not applied to mutual deter-
rence by two relatively matched nuclear powers, as in the state of
mutual assured destruction (MAD) of the nuclear standoff between
the Soviet Union and the United States.6 1 Perhaps the distinction
between mutual deterrence and nuclear blackmail fits Lindgren's
rule that the wrong chip is being used in the latter kind of interac-
tion. But the relevant moral insight may be much simpler:
Violence or the threat of violence is out of order except when used
to oppose violence or its threat. Why? Because, as in the argument
above, it cannot be mutually advantageous in general to have the
recourse to violence to settle other issues.
If we are to rule for or against blackmail, as we rule against
extortion with explosives, we must similarly do so before we come
to an instant case. I do not know whether the mutual advantage
principle recommends that exchange blackmail be outlawed or
legally supported. The issue turns on causal analyses. Yet the
literature on blackmail turns almost entirely on normative
claims.
62
Despite its apparent consistency and power, the mutual
advantage theory has a serious weakness that is easily seen in
piecemeal contexts but that may be less evident in arguments at the
level of institutional structures or rules. At some point, even if I get
a very slight benefit from an activity that brings you great harm, it
seems that our interaction will provoke interpersonal comparisons
that permit us to say I should suffer the minor loss in order to
protect you against the major loss. We might build such consider-
ations into institutional arrangements and legal rules, for example
by holding that some actions are legally wrong because they lead to
"reckless endangerment."63  Such an arrangement does not
" See Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100
YALE LJ. 2277, 2279 (1991) (describing international law as nothing more than "a
matter of diplomacy and the power politics of state interests").
60 See RICHARD K. BETrS, NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND NUCLEAR BALANCE 3-4 (1987).
61 See id. at 15.
62 But see Posner, supra note 5, at 1841-47 (surveying published judicial opinions
in blackmail cases).
63 After Lynne Guenther threatened to firebomb herself and her van on the
United Nations Plaza, she was charged with reckless endangerment and coercion. See
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necessarily imply that the ends of these actions are wrong; they
might even be good, but their cost, weighed interpersonally against
their gain, is too great. But we could not go very far with interper-
sonal comparisons without undermining the mutual advantage
argument.
A moral elitist might insist paternalistically on violating claims
of mutual advantage in blackmail on the ground that it is harmful
to people to submit to blackmail, that it is better for them to face
embarrassment with stoicism-even though many people might
firmly disagree. A mutual advantage theory cannot be tricked out
with such paternalistic claims without gutting its core. The only
general argument against blackmail that can fit mutual advantage
arguments must be in an institutional or ex ante form: ex ante each
would prefer that blackmail be illegal because each would expect to
be better off as a result. This is a hard empirical case to make,
either pro or con, and little effort has been made to address it.
Consider this more limited question. Suppose in our regime it is
legal to sell suppression of what another (such as the press) would
pay to publish. Ex ante, would we be better off in such a regime if
it were backed by enforceable contracts or if it were not? Unstable
expectations typically reduce the expected value of exchanges.
Hence, if a regime of legal blackmail for mutual advantage (case by
case) is itself mutually advantageous (institutionally and generally),
then contractual protection of such blackmail seems likely also to be
mutually advantageous. If blackmail for mutual advantage is legal,
it should be protected with enforceable contractsfr4
A motivating factor of the intellectual debate over blackmail may
be not its supposedly paradoxical aspect but merely the perverse
quality of much blackmail: one cannot go to law to block its use
and potential effects because law is public. Using the law causes a
harm for which the blackmail is only proximate cause. When joy
Silverman went to the F.B.I. about the blackmail threats she had
received, she risked public exposure roughly equivalent to what the
blackmailer threatened. When her blackmailer turned out to be
Judge Wachtler, she was subjected to massive, embarrassing news
coverage that has plausibly changed her life.65 One can go to law
Woman Pleads Guilty in U.N. Standoff Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, at 46. Many
might think that the charge of coercion-a close cousin of blackmail-was trivial by
comparison with the charge of endangerment.
4 For instance, Agnew arguably had an enforceable tacit contract to block
subsequent criminal action against him.
6 Silverman's name might not have been included in early press coverage. But
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to punish blackmail and thereby prospectively deter it, but one
cannot use the law to denature it. This may be half the reason
many want it criminalized rather than merely made a tort, since the
threat of criminal sanction may finally deter many blackmailers. Of
course, this is an institutionalist argument about the larger regime
for handling blackmail, not solely a moral analysis of an instance of
it.
Suppose we have concluded that blackmail is properly subject to
legal sanction. Why should the sanction necessarily be criminal
rather than tort? In the foregoing paragraph, it is implied that the
losses from a blackmail might exceed the gains to the blackmailer.
A general economic theory of criminal law could take this as the
criterion for deciding what to criminalize and what to leave to civil
suit.66 Traffic accidents can be treated as matters for tort settle-
ment because the general availability of driving and traveling by cars
and buses brings sufficiently more gains than losses to allow
taxation of motor vehicle users to cover the harms they cause.
67
When a tort suit cannot recoup my loss from a particular action by
another, that other person has inadequate incentive to attend to my
interests. 68 We can increase her incentive by adding a criminal
sanction for her actions. If blackmail generally produces losses, as
Coase, Ginsburg, Posner, and others suppose, 69 then we cannot
adequately deal with it as a tort but must motivate behavior with the
threat of criminal sanctions.
CONCLUSION
The argument here has all been from the mutual advantage
morality that underlies most of law and economics. This morality
is an interpersonally noncomparable version of utilitarianism. Some
other moral theory-for example, a rights, Kantian, virtue, or
communitarian theory, or a utilitarian theory with interpersonal
in order to catch Wachtler, she followed his instructions and ran an ad in the New
York Times. A Times editor quickly identified the ad and found out from the Times
business office who had placed it. SeeJosh Barbanel, ChiefJudge of New York State Is
Arrested in Extortion Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at 1, 49.
6 See Hardin, supra note 4, at 370-77.
67 For an outline of the efficiency aspects of tort law, see ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 340-71 (1988); POSNER, supra note 39, at 147-60.
68 See, e.g., A. MITCHELL PoLINsKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
67-74 & 69 n.40 (2d ed. 1989).
69 See Coase, supra note 38, at 674-75; Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 38, at
1873; Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 42-43.
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comparison and aggregation of welfare-might reach conclusions on
blackmail that differ from the conclusions of a mutual advantage
theory.70 But one theory's conclusions do not trump another's
unless the first theory trumps the other theory. After two and a half
millennia of moral theorizing, the number of theories in contention
seems to be increasing rather than decreasing. (Unfortunately, the
number of ad hoc and idiosyncratic intuitions seems also. to be
increasing.) There is little hope that any theory is soon going to
trump all the others. Any moral argument that concludes that
blackmail is right or wrong tout court is specious. Blackmail, like
every other kind of action or result, is right or wrong, good or bad
only as an implication of particular moral theories.
70 For this reason, Gorr's claim that I cannot be harmed by disclosure that I have
done something morally required is wrong. See Gorr, supra note 14, at 51. Suppose,
as a utilitarian, I have lied in order to bring about a good end. If my religious or
Kantian friends, with their rule-bound morality, learn of my lie, they might well treat
me differently, to my disadvantage. I did what I thought was morally required by
violating what they think is morally required.
